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ALTHOUGH A PARTY WHO SIGNS AN AGREEMENT IS USUALLY DEEMED TO HAVE READ IT, A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES MAY ALLOW ONE PARTY TO RELY ON THE ASSURANCES OF THE OTHER, A CERTIFIED BUT UNSIGNED TRANSCRIPT OF A DEPOSITION WAS ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN TIMELY MAILED TO OPPOSING COUNSEL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined, although the usual rule is one who signs an agreement is deemed to have read it, the rule may not apply when there is a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties and reliance on the assurances of a party (here the parties to a trust agreement were father and son). Plaintiff alleged he was fraudulently induced to sign the agreement. The court noted that a certified, unsigned transcript of a deposition was admissible because the transcript had been mailed to opposing counsel more than 60 days before the motion was brought:

Plaintiff’s claim … is that defendant led him to believe that the documentation that defendant presented for his signature (a trust agreement and two deeds) was for the conveyance of [one condominium unit] only. In fact, the paperwork provided for the conveyance of [two condominium units] to the trust. Ordinarily a person is bound by the terms of an instrument he or she signs, and may not claim to have justifiably relied on false representations concerning the contents of a document that he or she failed to read without valid excuse … . In this case, however, whether this principle applies to bar plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claim … cannot be determined as a matter of law because plaintiff alleges that he and defendant, his son, had a relationship of trust and confidence … . Tsai Chung Chao v Chao, 2018 NY Slip Op 03620, First Dept 5-17-18

​CONTRACT LAW (ALTHOUGH A PARTY WHO SIGNS AN AGREEMENT IS USUALLY DEEMED TO HAVE READ IT, A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES MAY ALLOW ONE PARTY TO RELY ON THE ASSURANCES OF THE OTHER, A CERTIFIED BUT UNSIGNED TRANSCRIPT OF A DEPOSITION WAS ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN TIMELY MAILED TO OPPOSING COUNSEL (FIRST DEPT))/FRAUD (FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT, ALTHOUGH A PARTY WHO SIGNS AN AGREEMENT IS USUALLY DEEMED TO HAVE READ IT, A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES MAY ALLOW ONE PARTY TO RELY ON THE ASSURANCES OF THE OTHER, A CERTIFIED BUT UNSIGNED TRANSCRIPT OF A DEPOSITION WAS ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN TIMELY MAILED TO OPPOSING COUNSEL (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (A CERTIFIED BUT UNSIGNED TRANSCRIPT OF A DEPOSITION WAS ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN TIMELY MAILED TO OPPOSING COUNSEL (FIRST DEPT))/DEPOSITIONS (A CERTIFIED BUT UNSIGNED TRANSCRIPT OF A DEPOSITION WAS ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN TIMELY MAILED TO OPPOSING COUNSEL (FIRST DEPT))

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