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ACCIDENT DID NOT INVOLVE AN ELEVATION-RELATED RISK, DEFENDANT SUBCONTRACTORS DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OF THE PLAINTIFF, THE AREA OR THE WORK, DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been dismissed because the accident, tripping over a pile of sand on ground level, did not involve an elevation-related risk. The Labor Law 241 (6) and 200 causes of  action should have been dismissed because the defendants (subcontractors USRC and A-Deck) did not exercise control over the plaintiff, the area or the work:

… [T]he Labor Law § 241(6) claim should be dismissed because neither USRC nor A-Deck may be held liable under that statute. “Labor Law § 241(6) does not automatically apply to all subcontractors on a site or in the chain of command'” … . “Rather, for liability under the statute to attach to a defendant, a plaintiff must show that the defendant exercised control either over the plaintiff, the specific work area involved or the work that gave rise to the injury” … . Here, there is no evidence that either USRC or A-Deck exercised any control over the plaintiff, the specific work area involved or the work that gave rise to plaintiff’s injury.

The Labor Law § 200 claim should also be dismissed as neither USRC nor A-Deck may be held liable under that statute. “Section 200 of the Labor Law merely codified the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or general contractor to provide construction site workmen with a safe place to work” … . “An implicit precondition to this duty to provide a safe place to work is that the party charged with that responsibility have the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury to enable it to avoid or correct an unsafe condition”  … . Here, there is no evidence that either USRC or A-Deck had the authority to control the activity that brought about plaintiff’s injury. Adagio v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 03744,  First Dept 5-24-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (ACCIDENT DID NOT INVOLVE AN ELEVATION-RELATED RISK, DEFENDANT SUBCONTRACTORS DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OF THE PLAINTIFF, THE AREA OR THE WORK, DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/SUBCONTRACTORS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ACCIDENT DID NOT INVOLVE AN ELEVATION-RELATED RISK, DEFENDANT SUBCONTRACTORS DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OF THE PLAINTIFF, THE AREA OR THE WORK, DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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