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LABOR LAW 240(1) APPLIES TO INJURIES INCURRED WHILE ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK AS DEFINED BY THE STATUTE; THE REACH OF LABOR LAW 200 IS NOT CONFINED TO CONSTRUCTION WORK; PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS STRUCK BY LOOSE PIECES OF PLYWOOD, WAS NOT ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK WHEN INJURED; THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD A LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION WAS THEREFORE PROPERLY DENIED; BUT THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD A LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to add a Labor Law section 200 cause of action should have been granted. Plaintiff was injured when struck by loose pieces of plywood. The motion to amend the complaint to add a Labor Law 240(1) cause of action was properly denied because the statute applies only to injuries incurred in construction activities (for which plaintiff was not employed). However Labor Law 200 deals with the duty to maintain a safe workplace and is not confined to construction work. Therefore the motion to add the Labor Law 200 cause of action should have been granted:

While the reach of Labor Law § 240(1) is not limited to work performed on actual construction sites, the task in which an injured employee was engaged must have been performed during “the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” … . This definition excludes routine maintenance … . The plaintiff’s deposition testimony demonstrated that he was employed as a porter and not in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning, or pointing of a building or structure within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1) when he put his hand on the unsecured plywood … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).

However, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200. Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty of an owner or general contractor to maintain a safe workplace … . Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the protection of Labor Law § 200 is not confined to construction work but covers all places to which the Labor Law applies … .Neil v Areeba, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 05963, Second Dept 10-14-26

Practice Point: The reach of Labor Law 240(1) is confined to construction work. The reach of Labor Law 200 is not so confined.

 

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