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PETITIONERS DID NOT LEARN OF THE BABY’S MEDICAL CONDITION UNTIL SIX MONTHS AFTER THE INDUCED LABOR; PETITIONERS REQUESTED LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE; ALTHOUGH THE HOSPITAL DID NOT HAVE TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE ESSENCE OF THE CLAIM, THE HOSPITAL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY PREJUDICE FROM THE DELAY BECAUSE THE MEDICAL ISSUES WERE FULLY DOCUMENTED; THE REQUEST TO FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioners’ request for leave to file a late notice of claim in this medical malpractice action should have been granted. Petitioner mother did not learn of her child’s medical condition until six months after her discharge from the hospital after labor was induced. Mother therefore had a reasonable excuse for failure to timely file a notice of claim. Although the hospital did not have timely knowledge of the nature of the claim, the hospital did not demonstrate any prejudice from the delay because the relevant issues were fully documented:

… [T]he court, in its discretion, must consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including, but not limited to, whether (1) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense” … . Another factor to consider is whether the claimant was an infant at the time the claim arose and whether there is a nexus between infancy and delay in service … , which was the case here. “‘[T]he presence or absence of any one factor is not determinative'” … .

Here, the petitioners established a reasonable excuse for the delay, to wit, the serious medical condition of the infant petitioner, which required numerous medical appointments while the condition of the infant petitioner was being assessed … . The petitioners failed to demonstrate that NYCHHC had actual knowledge of the facts underlying the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, since the hospital’s records did not evidence that the medical staff, by its acts or omissions, inflicted an injury attributable to malpractice … . However, “[s]ince the conduct at issue was fully documented in the medical records, the petitioner[s] made an initial showing that NYCHHC was not prejudiced by the delay in serving the notice of claim … , and, in response, the NYCHHC made no showing of prejudice” … . Matter of Caceres v NYC Health & Hosps., 2026 NY Slip Op 05182, Second Dept 9-2-26

Practice Point: Here the request to file a late notice of claim was granted despite the fact that the hospital did not have timely notice of the essence of the medical malpractice claim. Petitioners had a reasonable excuse for the delay and the hospital did not demonstrate any prejudice caused by the delay.

 

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