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PLAINTIFF STEPPED BACKWARD TO ALLOW OTHERS TO EXIT THE ELEVATOR; THE FLOOR OF THE ELEVATOR WAS SIX TO TWELVE INCHES ABOVE THE BUILDING FLOOR AND PLAINTIFF SEVERELY INJURED HIS KNEE; THE SIX TO TWELVE INCH GAP WAS NOT THE TYPE OF “ELEVATION RISK” COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the 6 to 12-inch gap between the floor of the elevator and the unfinished floor just outside the elevator door was not the type of “elevation risk” addressed by Labor Law 240(1). Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Labor Law 240(1) action should have been dismissed. However, Supreme Court properly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the Labor Law 200 cause of action (unsafe condition):

Supreme Court should have granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment to the extent it sought dismissal of the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. Not every fall results in the “extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1)” … . The statute protects workers only from those falls stemming from the “extraordinary elevation risks” created by “the relative elevation at which the [work] must be performed” and not from “the usual and ordinary dangers of a construction site” … .

It is true that “there is no bright-line minimum height differential that determines whether an elevation hazard exists” … . However, under the present circumstances, the 6-to-12 inch gap between the elevator doorway and the floor “was not a physically significant height elevation differential to trigger the protection of Labor Law § 240(1)” … . Also, neither the elevator nor the missing ramp was the “functional equivalent of a safety device enumerated in the statute” … . Instead, the record supports a conclusion that plaintiff’s injury arose from the type of “usual and ordinary” perils plaintiff could expect at his job site … . Ambrose v City Univ. Constr. Fund, 2026 NY Slip Op 05060, Second Dept 8-20-26

Practice Point: Here the six to twelve inch gap between the floor of the elevator and the building floor was not the type of “elevation risk” covered by Labor Law 240(1). Labor Law 200 (unsafe condition) may apply.​

 

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