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PROPERTY OWNED BY A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND A TRUST IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTIONS OF THE UNIFORM PARTITION OF HEIRS PROPERTY ACT (RPAPL 993); THOSE ENTITIES ARE NOT “INDIVIDUALS” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this partition action, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Golla, determined a limited liability company and a trust are not “individuals” within the meaning of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) section 993:

In a case of first impression before this Court, we are asked to determine whether property owned wholly by a trust and a limited liability company may constitute “heirs property” pursuant to the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act (RPAPL 993). That question requires a determination as to whether a trust and a limited liability company are “individual[s]” within the meaning of RPAPL 993. … [W]e find that trusts and limited liability companies are not “individual[s]” under RPAPL 993. Property wholly owned by such entities, and not owned by individuals who acquired title from a relative, cannot be “heirs property” within the meaning of the statute. * * *

Here, the brothers, after owning the subject property themselves for more than half a century, put their interests in the subject property into these sophisticated legal entities. The owners’ status as sophisticated legal entities provides its own protections from predatory parties. In any event, here, there is no outside third party who is seeking to invade a family’s right to possess real property, further demonstrating that the owners are not entitled to the protections of RPAPL 993. Flouret v Sagland, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 05009, Second Dept 8-19-26

 

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