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AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING THE ARRESTING OFFICER TESTIFIED HIS PARTNER TOLD HIM THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST AFTER HIS PARTNER SPOKE TO THE DRIVER; THE DEFENSE CHALLENGED THE INFORMATION IMPARTED BY THE DRIVER TO THE PARTNER UNDER THE FELLOW OFFICER RULE; BECAUSE NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO DEMONSTRATE THE PARTNER HAD THE REQUISITE LEVEL OF SUSPICION, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the denial of defendant’s suppression motion, determined the People did not present evidence at the suppression hearing justifying handcuffing the defendant after a “tinted windows” traffic stop. The officer who testified at the hearing said his partner told him there was probable cause but he was not aware of what the driver told his partner. Because the defense challenged the information under the fellow officer rule, the People were required to demonstrate the officer who spoke with the driver had the requisite level of suspicion, but no evidence on that issue was presented:

We agree with defendant that, under these circumstances, by placing him in handcuffs after directing him to exit the vehicle, the troopers transformed the traffic stop into, at minimum, a “forcible stop and detention” … , which “must be justified by some additional circumstances, such as a threat of evasive conduct . . . ; a need to transport the defendant for a showup procedure . . . ; a fear that the suspect may interfere with the execution of a search warrant . . . ; or a concern for officer safety” … .

Although … the Trooper testified that he observed an “orange pill bottle with no markings on it in the center console of the vehicle,” that alone is insufficient to justify the forcible stop and detention … . The Trooper conceded that he could not see inside the bottle and did not know what was inside. He also did not observe any other indicia of criminality and did not see defendant acting in a suspicious manner. Although a conversation took place between the Trooper and his partner, defendant challenged that information under the fellow officer rule. The People were thus required to establish at the hearing that the partner, who imparted information to the Trooper, in fact possessed the requisite level of suspicion to act … . Here, however, the Trooper’s partner did not testify, and the Trooper testified that his partner did not relay the substance of the conversation with the driver to him. We are therefore unable to infer that the Trooper received information sufficient to justify his subsequent actions … . People v Purrier, 2026 NY Slip Op 04681, Fourth Dept 7-24-26

Practice Point: This case presents another example of a defense challenge to information passed from one police officer to another in the context of a probable-cause determination at a suppression hearing. The officer who testified at the hearing relied on information from his partner who told him there was probable cause to arrest after the partner spoke with the driver.  Because of the challenge under the fellow officer rule, the People were required to demonstrate the partner had the requisite level of suspicion after speaking with the driver, but the People presented no testimony on that issue.

 

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