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WHERE THE SENTENCING JUDGE ORDERS DOCCS TO ENROLL DEFENDANT IN A SHOCK PROBATION PROGRAM, DOCCS CANNOT CONSIDER THE ORDER TO BE MERELY A RECOMMENDATION WHICH CAN BE IGNORED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, determined the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) did not have the discretion to treat Supreme Court’s order to enroll petitioner in the shock probation program as a recommendation which need not be implemented. Although the petitioner had been released from incarceration, the Third Department considered the case as an exception to the mootness doctrine:

… [W]hen applying the literal language of Penal Law § 60.04 (7) (a) and Correction Law § 865 (1), the most rational interpretation of the statutes is that, when the same sentencing judge imposes concurrent sentences on convictions for an eligible drug offense and another non-enumerated offense, the sentencing judge’s directive to enroll an eligible incarcerated individual into the shock incarceration program upon the conviction for the qualifying drug offense is binding on DOCCS, so long as the conviction on the additional non-drug offense is not one of the disqualifying offenses listed in Correction Law § 865 (1). Matter of Adams v Martuscello, 2026 NY Slip Op 04542, Third Dept 7-23-26

Practice Point: Absent a statutory exception, DOCCS must implement a sentencing judge’s order to enroll defendant in the shock probation program.

 

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