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THE BANK’S NOTICE OF DEFAULT WHICH STATED THE MORTGAGE DEBT WOULD BE ACCELERATED IF THE ARREARS WERE NOT PAID IN 32 DAYS WAS A STATEMENT OF FUTURE INTENT AND DID NOT SERVE TO ACCELERATE THE DEBT; THEREFORE THE NOTICE DID NOT TRIGGER THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TIMELY BROUGHT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the notice by the bank stating that the mortgage debt would be accelerated if the defendant did not pay the arrears withing 32 days was merely a statement of future intent and did not serve to accelerate the debt. Therefore the notice did not trigger the running of the six-year statute of limitations and the foreclosure action should not have been dismissed:

… [T]he July 31, 2010 default notice did not accelerate the debt. The language in the default notice, that the mortgage debt would be accelerated if Edmund J. Burns, Jr., did not pay the arrears within 32 days from the date of the default notice, was merely an expression of future intent that fell short of an actual acceleration of the mortgage debt … . The mortgage debt was not accelerated until the plaintiff commenced the first action on December 12, 2012, and elected in the complaint to call due the entire loan amount and demanded payment of the outstanding loan in full … . This action was timely commenced on June 29, 2017, prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on December 12, 2018. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v Burns, 2026 NY Slip Op 03658, Second Dept 6-10-26

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action, a notice of default which states the mortgage debt will be accelerated if the arrears are not paid in 32 days does not accelerate the debt and therefore does not trigger the six-year statute of limitations.

 

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