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ALTHOUGH THERE WAS PROOF THE 90-DAY NOTICES WERE MAILED TO THE PRO SE PLAINTIFFS, THERE WAS ALSO PROOF THE MAIL WAS NOT DELIVERED AND WAS RETURNED; WITHOUT PROOF PLAINTIFFS ACTUALLY RECEIVED THE 90-DAY NOTICES, THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE ACTION FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to dismiss the action for want of prosecution should not have been granted. Although there was proof defendants (the Cohens) mailed the 90-day notices to the pro se plaintiffs, there was no proof the notices were received (the mailings were returned):

In August 2023, more than a year after the expiration of the stay, the Cohens moved … pursuant to CPLR 3216 to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute. In support of the motion, the Cohens submitted evidence that in August 2022 they mailed 90-day demands pursuant to CPLR 3216(b)(3) to the plaintiffs, who were then pro se, by certified mail. The Cohens also submitted evidence, however, that the mailings were returned to them. The United States Postal Service tracking history submitted by the Cohens indicated that one delivery was attempted and that five days later a reminder was sent to schedule redelivery before the mailings were returned to the sender. * * *

CPLR 3216 permits a court to dismiss an action for want of prosecution only after the court or the defendant has served the plaintiff with a written demand requiring the plaintiff “to resume prosecution of the action and to serve and file a note of issue within [90] days after receipt of such demand” … . “Notably, the time within which the plaintiff must act runs from the receipt, and not the service of the demand” … . Here, in support of their motion, the Cohens submitted proof that the 90-day demands were not received by the plaintiffs. Kurbonov v Cohen, 2026 NY Slip Op 01044, Second Dept 2-25-26

Practice Point: To support a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, the defendant must proof the 90-day notice was actually received by the pro se plaintiff. Proof of mailing is not enough.

 

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