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THIS LAWSUIT BY AN EMPLOYER AGAINST AN EMPLOYEE WHO ALLEGEDLY USED PLAINTIFF’S PROPRIETARY INFORMATION AFTER RESIGNING PRESENTS FACT-SPECIFIC ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, COPYRIGHT LAW (PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS), TRADE SECRETS, AND THE PROPRIETY OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; ALL OF THESE COMPLEX ISSUES CANNOT BE FAIRLY SUMMARIZED HERE; THE DECISION IS WORTH CONSULTING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Copyright Act pre-empted some but not all of plaintiff’s breach of confidentiality and breach of employment contract claims, defendants’ cross-motions to dismiss sounding in unfair competition should not have granted; the complaint stated a cause of action for unfair competition based on misappropriation of proprietary information; the complaint stated a cause of action for violation of a restrictive covenant prohibiting disclosure of trade secrets; the record was insufficient to support Supreme Court’s ruling that plaintiff engaged in overreaching to obtain the restrictive covenants; and plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction should have been granted. These complex, fact-specific issues cannot be fairly summarized here. With regard to pre-emption and the preliminary injunction, the court wrote:

“Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts a state law claim if: ‘(i) the work at issue comes within the subject matter of copyright and (ii) the right being asserted is equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright'” … . Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides copyright owners the exclusive rights, among other things, to reproduce a copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works, to distribute copies of the work to the public, and to display the work publicly … . “A state law right is equivalent to one of the exclusive rights of copyright if it may be abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one of the exclusive rights” … . A claim is not equivalent “if an extra element is required instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display, in order to constitute a state-created cause of action,” and in such circumstances, there is no preemption … . Here, contrary to the defendants’ contentions, the plaintiff sufficiently alleged an extra element—violation of a duty of confidentiality and breach of the employment agreement—in addition to acts of reproduction, adaptation, performance, distribution, or display, that renders the state right qualitatively distinct from the federal right, thereby foreclosing preemption … . * * *

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction, and (3) that the equities balance in his or her favor” (… see CPLR 6301). Here, the plaintiff showed that trade secrets existed and established a likelihood of success on the merits … . Premium Prods., Inc. v O’Malley, 2026 NY Slip Op 00918, Second Dept 2-18-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the wide range of issues raised by the allegation that a former employee has appropriated and used the employer’s proprietary information after resigning.​

 

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