You are here: / / EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE IN AN INSURANCE POLICY ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED...
,

EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE IN AN INSURANCE POLICY ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE INSURER; HERE DAMAGE CAUSED BY “INTERIOR TILE” WORK WAS COVERED UNDER THE POLICY; IN PREPARING THE BATHROOM FLOOR FOR TILING THE INSURED USED WELDING EQUIPMENT WHICH CAUSED A FIRE; THE INSURER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE PREPARATORY WORK WAS NOT ENCOMPASSED BY THE COVERAGE FOR “INTERIOR TILE” WORK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff insurance company was, by the terms of the policy, obligated to cover property damage caused by defendant contractor, who was retained to refurbish a bathroom. The policy issued by plaintiff to defendant excluded from coverage any property damage caused by  the defendant. There was an “exception to the exclusion” for “interior tile” work. In preparing the bathroom floor for tiling, defendant’s worker used welding equipment which started a fire, causing damage. The question before the court was whether the “interior tile” work “exception to the exclusion” included the preparation for the tile work using welding equipment:

Policy exclusions must be stated “in clear and unmistakable terms so that no one could be misled” … and “are to be accorded a strict and narrow construction” … . To avoid coverage pursuant to an exclusion, the insurer must establish that the exclusions or exemptions apply to the incident in question and are subject to “no other reasonable interpretation” … .

Plaintiff here failed to meet this burden. The Policy fails to define “interior tile” work. Nor does it indicate the scope or extent of what constitutes “tiling work” or articulate whether the phrase was meant to encompass closely related preparatory tasks, which is a reasonable interpretation advanced by defendants … . Accordingly, the Policy’s exclusions and the “interior tile” exception is ambiguous. The record before us is conclusory and does not resolve these ambiguities. Well-settled “precedent[] require us to adopt the readings that narrow the exclusion[]” and construe ambiguities against the insurer plaintiff, resulting in coverage as a matter of law … . Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v Michelle Kuo Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op 00427, Frist Dept 1-29-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into how a court will strictly construe “exceptions” to “exclusions from coverage” in an insurance policy.

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF ALLEGED DEFENDANTS-ATTORNEYS DID NOT ADVISE IT OF AN AMENDMENT TO THE COMMERCIAL LEASE WHICH EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATED THE OPTION FOR PLAINTIFF TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY FOR $11.4 MILLION IF THE LANDLORD RECEIVES A BONA FIDE PURCHASE OFFER; THE LANDLORD IN FACT RECEIVED SUCH AN OFFER AND PLAINITFF EXERCISED ITS OPTION, BUT PAID $14.5 MILLION (FIRST DEPT). ​
SUPREME COURT, PURSUANT TO CPLR ARTICLE 77, PROPERLY RESOLVED THE DISTRIBUTION OF A $4.5 BILLION GLOBAL SETTLEMENT PAYMENT BY JP MORGAN CHASE IN THIS RESIDENTIAL-MORTGAGE-BACKED-SECURITIES-RELATED ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
RECENT CHANGES TO THE STATUTES: (1) REQUIRING A LANDLORD TO MITIGATE DAMAGES WHEN A TENANT ABANDONS A RESIDENTIAL APARTMENT BEFORE THE END OF THE LEASE; AND (2), APPLYNG A SECURITY DEPOSIT TO REPAIRS, INTERPRETED AND APPLIED (FIRST DEPT).
COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON UNSIGNED COPIES OF A DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RETURN SIGNED COPIES WITHIN 60 DAYS AND DID NOT CHALLENGE THE ACCURACY OF THE TRANSCRIPT (FIRST DEPT).
NEW JERSEY FORGED INSTRUMENT CONVICTION WAS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF A NEW YORK FELONY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE BASIS OF SECOND FELONY OFFENDER STATUS (FIRST DEPT).
Motion to Renew Was Not Based Upon a Change in the Applicable Law—Motion Court Had Simply Ignored the Controlling Precedent—Therefore the Motion Was Actually a Motion to Reargue, the Denial of Which Is Not Appealable
THE FIRST EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT INCLUDED A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE, THE SECOND AGREEMENT REQUIRED ARBITRATION, THE SECOND AGREEMENT SUPERSEDED THE FIRST (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF FELL ABOUT NINE FEET FROM ONE FLOOR TO ANOTHER, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANTS-ATTORNEYS WAIVED A DEFENSE WITHOUT THEIR CLIENTS’ CONSENT;... IF THE UNDERLYING INSURANCE POLICY DOES NOT INDICATE THAT A WRITTEN AGREEMENT...