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DEFENDANT BASED HIS DECISION TO PLEAD GUILTY, IN PART, ON INACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT HIS SENTENCING EXPOSURE; GUILTY PLEAS VACATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s guilty pleas, determined the misinformation provided to the defendant about his sentencing exposure rendered the pleas invalid:

Defendant was told that he faced the possibility of serving two consecutive 15-year sentences if he elected to go to trial. At most, however, he was facing 20 years because of the statutory cap (see Penal Law § 70.30 [1] [e] [i]). Unbeknown to him, he was weighing the benefit of a plea offer of 20 years when in reality, it was the maximum he would serve even if convicted after trial. Defendant was not told about the capping statute and therefore lacked a “full understanding of what his plea connotes and of its consequence” … . This is particularly true because defendant’s guilty plea afforded him the exact sentence he would have served. The record is also clear that defendant remained conflicted about pleading guilty and sought to withdraw his plea.

The totality of the circumstances reflect that defendant’s sentencing exposure played a decisive role in his decision to plead guilty, and his erroneous understanding that he faced 30 years in prison if he was convicted after trial had an “impact on [his] judgment” significant enough to render his guilty plea not knowing, voluntary and intelligent … . People v Ramos, 2026 NY Slip Op 00430, First Dept 1-29-26

Practice Point: Here defendant agreed to a 20-year sentence with the understanding he could be sentenced to 30 years after trial. In fact, his sentence after trial would be capped at 20 years. His guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary and intelligent.

 

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