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THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN PLAINTIFF’S RENTED STORAGE FACILITY WAS SOLD AT AUCTION BASED ON PLAINTIFF’S PURPORTED FAILURE TO PAY RENT; WHEN THE DEFENDANT STORAGE FACILITY OWNER REALIZED THE RENT HAD BEEN PAID BY PLAINTIFF’S PARTNER, DEFENDANT RESCINDED THE SALE OF PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY, WAIVED LATE FEES, RETURNED THE MONEY TO THE BUYER AND ADVISED THE BUYER TO RETURN THE PROPERTY TO PLAINITFF; ALLEGING PROPERTY WAS MISSING, PLAINTIFF SUED UNDER LIEN LAW 182 FOR “WRONGFUL SALE” OF THE PROPERTY; AFTER AN EXTENSIVE STATUTORY ANALYSIS, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED LIEN LAW 182 DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR “WRONGFUL SALE” (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Wooten, affirming Supreme Court, determined defendant could not maintain an action against defendant storage facility based on a violation of Lien Law section 182. Defendant storage facility had not noticed that payments made by plaintiff’s partner, who rented a separate storage facility, were supposed to be applied to plaintiff’s rent. At the time defendant learned of the payments made by plaintiff’s partner, defendant had sold the items in plaintiff’s storage facility at an auction. Defendant rescinded the sale, waived the assessed late fees, returned the money paid by the buyer of plaintiff’s personal property, and advised the buyer to return the property. Plaintiff then sued for “wrongful sale” pursuant to Lien Law 182, alleging that some of his property was missing. Lien Law 182(7)(a) provides that any person claiming an interest goods to be sold at auction can bring a special proceeding within 10 days of the service of notice of the auction. No such special proceeding was brought by plaintiff. Both Supreme Court and the Second Department held that Lien Law 182 does not create a cause of action for “wrongful sale:”

Here, Lien Law § 182 provides that the remedy where a person “disputes the validity of the lien, or the amount claimed,” is to “bring a proceeding hereunder within ten days of the service of the notice” (id. § 182[7][a]), for which the remedy, if the person who commences the proceeding prevails, is “the entry of judgment cancelling the lien or reducing the amount claimed thereunder,” and a directive that “the person shall be entitled to possession of the property” if the lien is canceled (id. § 182[9]). The statute also provides for a “[p]rivate right of action” “for recovery of damages and the return of [the] goods” for “[a]ny occupant damaged by an unlawful detention of his [or her] goods or any other violation of this section” (id. § 182[4][a]).

To the extent the plaintiff attempts to equate his allegation of a wrongful sale with an “unlawful detention,” for which the statute recognizes a “[p]rivate right of action” (id. § 182[4][a]), the plaintiff’s contention is without merit. An “unlawful detention of goods” is unambiguously defined under the statute as an owner’s “refus[al] to surrender goods stored by him [or her] for an occupant upon payment by the occupant of the occupancy fees permitted by this section” (id. § 182[3]). That definition does not mention or reference the sale of goods stored by an owner, and thus, the phrase “unlawful detention” cannot be read as encompassing the plaintiff’s allegation of a wrongful sale. Heins v Public Stor., 2025 NY Slip Op 06605, Second De[t 11-26-25

Practice Point: Lien Law 182 provides that a person with an interest in property to be sold at auction pursuant to the Lien Law may bring a special proceeding to dispute the validity of the lien or the amount claimed within ten days of service of notice of the auction (which was not done here). Lien Law 182 does not create a private right of action for “wrongful sale” of the property at the action. Therefore plaintiff’s “wrongful sale” cause of action was properly dismissed after trial pursuant to CPLR 4401.​

 

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