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PLAINTIFF WIRED $300,000 TO AN ACCOUNT IN DEFENDANT BANK WHICH HAD BEEN SET UP BY A FRAUDSTER TO DEFRAUD PLAINTIFF; PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PLEAD A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH DEFENDANT BANK WHICH IS REQUIRED BEFORE A DUTY (OWED TO PLAINTIFF) TO ENFORCE ITS ANTI-FRAUD PROCEDURES ARISES; THE COMPLAINT THEREFORE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a one-sentence memorandum decision which adopted the reasoning of the Second Department dissent by Justice Higgitt, reversed the Second Department’s ruling that the complaint adequately pled a special relationship between the bank and plaintiff and held that the bank’s motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted. There must have existed a special relationship between defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank and plaintiff before a duty (owed to plaintiff) to enforce the bank’s anti-fraud procedures arises. Defendant David Tate had opened an account at a New Jersey Chase bank in the name of his business, Alchemy. Tate did not provide any personal identification or any corporate documentation to the bank. Plaintiff, thinking she was investing in Alchemy, wired $300,000 to the Alchemy account which was appropriated by Tate. As Justice Higgitt wrote in his dissent:

On this appeal, which involves an individual who was swindled when she authorized a wire transfer to the account of a fraudster, we are asked to determine whether New Jersey law recognizes a common-law duty on the part of a bank to an existing customer to exercise reasonable care before permitting a potential customer to open an account. I find that a duty to exercise such care exists only when a bank has a “special relationship” with its existing customer from which that duty should be deemed to flow. The amended complaint, however, fails to allege facts suggesting that a special relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant Bank. Therefore, defendant Bank’s CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion should have been granted. Ben-Dor v Alchemy Consultant LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 03797, Second Dept 7-11-24; Ben-Dor v Alchemy Consultant LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 06538 CtApp 11-25-25

Practice Point: In New Jersey, to sue a bank for the wrongful conduct of a third party, here the use of a bank account to defraud plaintiff, the bank must owe plaintiff a special duty. Reversing the Second Department and adopting the reasoning of the dissent, the Court of Appeals held the complaint should have been dismissed because it did not adequately allege the existence of a special relationship between the bank and the plaintiff.

 

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