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THE MOTION COURT PROPERLY ISSUED A PROTECTIVE ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL IN THIS MED MAL CASE TO RESCIND THE CORRESPONDENCE SENT TO PLAINTIFF’S TREATMENT PROVIDERS WHICH DISCOURAGED THEM FROM SPEAKING WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE MAJORITY WAS IMPROPERLY ISSUING AN ADVISORY OPINION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a dissent which argued the majority was improperly issuing an advisory opinion, determined the trial judge in this medical malpractice action properly ordered plaintiff’s counsel rescind correspondence sent to treatment providers which discouraged the treatment providers from speaking with defense counsel. The correspondence accompanied the “Arons” speaking authorizations executed by the plaintiff:

… [A] plaintiff who signs an authorization allowing a treating physician to speak to defense counsel about the plaintiff’s medical condition at issue should not be allowed to send a letter separately to the same physician requesting that the physician not speak to defense counsel. Permitting plaintiffs to make such a request would undermine the purpose of the Arons authorization and, at the very least, be confusing to the physician … .

Adding to the confusion is the statement “I value and wish to protect the confidentiality of our physician-patient relationship,” which may lead the physician to conclude that, notwithstanding plaintiff’s execution of the speaking authorization, plaintiff was not actually waiving the physician-patient privilege or the privacy protections afforded by HIPAA. …

… [T]he letter … might lead the physician to believe, wrongly, that plaintiff has a right to attend any informal interview with defense counsel. … [A] defendant’s attorney may ask treating physicians to participate in ex parte interviews, which by definition do not involve the plaintiff. While a physician may insist that the plaintiff be present for such an interview, that is a decision for the physician alone to make. Just as a defendant’s attorney has no right to interview the physician informally … , a plaintiff has no right to attend the interview (the plaintiff has only the right to ask the physician for permission to attend an interview).

Based on the above, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in directing plaintiff “to send correspondence to his treating physicians rescinding all prior letters sent containing the language that the [c]ourt has deemed to be confusing, misleading and/or intimidating.”  Murphy v Kaleida Health, 2025 NY Slip Op 06421, Fourth Dept 11-21-25

Practice Point: Here the letters sent to treatment providers by plaintiff’s counsel, which accompanied the “Arons” speaking authorizations, improperly discouraged the treatment providers from speaking with defense counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel was properly ordered to rescind the correspondence.

 

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