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THE ADMINSTRATOR’S SIX-YEAR DELAYING IN SEEKING SUBSTITUTION FOR THE DECEASED PLAINTFF, COUPLED WITH THE PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE, WARRANTED DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the administrator’s six-year delay in substituting the estate for the deceased in this personal injury case, warranted dismissal of the complaint:

“The death of a party divests the court of jurisdiction and stays the proceedings until a proper substitution has been made” … . CPLR 1021 provides that “[a] motion for substitution may be made by the successors or representatives of a party or by any party” … and requires that such substitution “be made within a reasonable time” …. If substitution is not made within a reasonable time, “the action may be dismissed as to the party for whom substitution should have been made” (CPLR 1021). “[T]he determination of whether the timing is reasonable requires consideration of several factors, including the diligence of the party seeking substitution, the prejudice to the other parties, and whether the party to be substituted has shown that the action or the defense has potential merit” … .

Here, the administrator’s protracted delay of almost six years in obtaining limited letters of administration so as to be substituted in this action, for which he provided no explanation in his initial motion papers and only an unsubstantiated, partial explanation in his reply attorney affirmation, demonstrated a lack of diligence. Furthermore, in this 16-year-old personal injury action, in which the deposition of the bus driver was never obtained, the administrator failed to rebut the defendants’ showing of prejudice arising both from the passage of time and the unavailability of the bus driver. Finally, the administrator did not submit in support of his motion the complaint, a bill of particulars, deposition transcripts, or any proof at all as to the potential merit of the cause of action. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the administrator’s motion and, in effect, denying the defendants’ application to dismiss the complaint for failure to timely seek substitution ..Watson v New York City Tr. Auth., 2025 NY Slip Op 05718, Second Dept 10-15-25

Practice Point: Here an administrator’s six-year delay in seeking substitution for the deceased plaintiff, coupled with prejudice to the defendant, warranted dismissal of the personal injury complaint.

 

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