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You are here: Home1 / Uncategorized2 / APPELLANT WAS SLOWING DOWN APPROACHING PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WHICH...
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APPELLANT WAS SLOWING DOWN APPROACHING PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WHICH WAS STOPPED WHEN APPELLANT WAS STRUCK FROM BEHIND AND PUSHED INTO PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE; APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in this rear-end collision case. Appellant was slowing down approach plaintiff’s car in front, which was stopped, when appellant was struck from behind and pushed into plaintiff. Appellant was entitled to summary judgment:

“A ‘defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident'” … . “A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, requiring that operator to come forward with evidence of a nonnegligent explanation for the collision in order to rebut the inference of negligence” … . “‘Evidence that a vehicle was struck in the rear and propelled into the vehicle in front of it may provide a sufficient non-negligent explanation for the collision'” … . The operator of the middle vehicle in a three-vehicle chain-collision accident may establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the middle vehicle was stopped or safely slowing down to a stop behind the lead vehicle when it was struck from behind by the rear vehicle and propelled into the lead vehicle … .

Here, the appellant submitted evidence that demonstrated that his vehicle was struck in the rear by the respondents’ vehicle while his foot was on the brake and he was in the process of slowing down. Since the appellant was in the process of safely slowing down to a stop behind the plaintiffs’ vehicle, which was at a stop, when his vehicle was struck from behind, he established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … . Sherman v Edwards, 2025 NY Slip Op 05713, Second Dept 10-15-25

Practice Point: When a driver is in the process of braking approaching a stopped vehicle and is struck from behind and pushed into the stopped vehicle, the driver is not negligent.

 

October 15, 2025
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-10-15 11:55:172025-10-20 13:30:10APPELLANT WAS SLOWING DOWN APPROACHING PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WHICH WAS STOPPED WHEN APPELLANT WAS STRUCK FROM BEHIND AND PUSHED INTO PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE; APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).
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