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IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT SUIT AGAINST THE COUNTY ALLEGING NEGLIGENT PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE, THE COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS ENTITLED TO GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IMMUNITY OR IMMUNITY PURSUANT TO THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county did not have immunity in this Child Victims Act lawsuit alleging negligent foster-care placement of plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged she was sexually abused by her foster father in the late 70’s:

“The governmental function immunity defense provides immunity for the exercise of discretionary authority during the performance of a governmental function” … . “[T]he governmental function immunity defense cannot attach unless the municipal defendant establishes that the discretion possessed by its employees was in fact exercised in relation to the conduct on which liability is predicated” … .

… [T]he County failed to establish, prima facie, that the relevant acts of the County’s employees relating to the alleged negligent supervision of the plaintiff’s foster care placement were discretionary and thus entitled to immunity … . … [E]ven if the acts at issue could potentially be considered discretionary, the County failed to demonstrate that the alleged discretion was in fact exercised in relation to the conduct on which liability is predicated … .

… Contrary to the County’s contention, it “was not entitled to qualified immunity pursuant to Social Services Law § 419, as qualified immunity does not bar recovery for the negligent supervision of children in foster care” … . M.W. v Nassau County, 2025 NY Slip Op 05550, Second Dept 10-8-25

Practice Point: Use this decision as a starting point for research into how governmental function immunity and immunity under the Social Services Law apply to a county foster-care placement. Here the court determined neither type of immunity applied in this Child Victims Act lawsuit.

 

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