THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE NOT INTERTWINED; THE VERDICT FINDING DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT BUT THAT THE NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE; IN RESPONSE TO A JURY NOTE, THE JUDGE PROPERLY TOLD THEM THEY COULD FIND THAT THE ACCIDENT DID NOT HAPPEN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to set aside the verdict finding the defendant negligent but that the negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident should not have been set aside. The plaintiff alleged repair to the steering mechanism of his van was negligently done, that he suddenly lost the ability to steer the van and it crashed into a concrete barrier which was parallel to the roadway. The evidence was such that the jury could have found the accident did not happen in the way alleged by the plaintiff. The damage to the van did not appear to be consistent with the accident as described by plaintiff. When the jury sent a note asking whether they could find that the accident didn’t happen, the trial judge properly told them they could so find:

The narrow question we must address to determine this appeal is whether the Supreme Court properly, in effect, granted those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside so much of the jury verdict as, upon finding that the defendants were negligent, found that such negligence was not a substantial factor in causing injury to the plaintiff … . We answer this question in the negative, holding that the court erred by, in effect, granting those branches of the plaintiff’s motion where, as here, issues of negligence and proximate cause are not inextricably intertwined as a result of there being a rational view of the evidence that the plaintiff’s accident did not occur as claimed. Additionally, this appeal provides the opportunity to state our view that, in a personal injury action where there were questions about whether the alleged injury-producing event actually occurred as claimed by the plaintiff here, it was not error for the court to respond to a jury note by instructing that the jury could consider whether the alleged accident occurred. * * *

If, as the Supreme Court concluded in this instance, the jury’s deliberation involved an uncomplicated determination of whether the defendants had negligently installed the pitman arm of the plaintiff’s van, which, in turn, resulted in the plaintiff’s loss of steering and the accident as described, then the jury’s finding of negligence without a finding of proximate cause would be inconsistent. But the trial evidence was not so uncomplicated as to be subject to only one view of the events. Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants, as we must in these instances, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences upon which the jury could parse the alleged negligent repair from the alleged proximate cause and determine that while the defendants were negligent, they were not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s claimed accident … . Krohn v Schultz Ford Lincoln, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 05072, Second Dept 9-24-25

Practice Point: Here the jury concluded the defendant’s repair of plaintiff’s van was negligent, but they also concluded the negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. That verdict should not have been set aside. The evidence was such that the jury could have found that the accident as described by the plaintiff didn’t happen. The judge properly instructed them in response to a note that they could so find.