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Proof of the Cause of Plaintiff’s Slip and Fall Need Not Be Based Upon Plaintiff’s Personal Knowledge

Although proof the cause of a slip and fall cannot be based on speculation, the Second Department noted the proof of the cause need not be based upon plaintiff’s personal knowledge:

A defendant may establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that the plaintiff cannot identify the cause of his or her fall … . If a plaintiff is unable to identify the cause of a fall, any finding of negligence would be based upon speculation … . “That does not mean that a plaintiff must have personal knowledge of the cause of his or her fall. Rather, it means only that a plaintiff’s inability to establish the cause of his or [her] fall—whether by personal knowledge or by other admissible proof—is fatal to a cause of action based on negligence” … .  Pol v Gjonbalaj, 2015 NY Slip Op 01625, 2nd Dept 2-25-15

 

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