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IF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS OUT ON A SATURDAY, PLAINTIFF HAS UNTIL THE FOLLOWING MONDAY TO COMMENCE THE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the dental malpractice action was timely commenced. The last day of the statute of limitations fell on a Saturday and General Construction Law section 25-a (1) provided an extension until the following Monday:

General Construction Law § 25-a(1) provides that when the period of time within which an act is required to be done ends on a Saturday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day. A dental malpractice action must be commenced “within two years and six months of the act, omission or failure complained of or last treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the said act, omission or failure” (CPLR 214-a). In support of their motion, the defendants established that the plaintiff was last treated … on August 1, 2017. Although two years and six months from that date is February 1, 2020, we take judicial notice of the fact that February 1, 2020, was a Saturday … . Thus, pursuant to General Construction Law § 25-a(1), the plaintiff had until Monday, February 3, 2020, to commence this action … . As this action was commenced on February 2, 2020, it was timely commenced. Chen v New York Hotel Trades Counsel Health Ctr., Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 04466, Second Dept 7-30-25

Practice Point: Pursuant to the General Construction Law, if the statute of limitations runs out on a Saturday the action can be timely commenced on the following Monday.

 

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