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THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED PLAINTIFF IN THIS ASBESTOS-EXPOSURE CASE PROVED GENERAL AND SPECIFIC CAUSATION THROUGH EXPERT TESTIMONY; THE DISSENT ARGUED NEITHER CAUSATION ELEMENT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, affirming the denial of the defense motion to set aside the verdict in this asbestos-exposure case, determined plaintiff, through expert testimony, demonstrated both general and specific causation. The dissent found the causation evidence insufficient:

… [I]t is well established that, in cases involving exposure to asbestos or other toxins, ” ‘an opinion on causation should set forth a plaintiff’s exposure to a toxin, that the toxin is capable of causing the particular illness (general causation) and that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause the illness (specific causation)’ ” … . ” ‘[I]t is not always necessary for a plaintiff to quantify exposure levels precisely or use the dose-response relationship, provided that whatever methods an expert uses to establish causation are generally accepted in the scientific community’ ” … . Indeed, “there may be several ways” for an expert to demonstrate causation, but “any method used must be ‘generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community’ ” … .

From the dissent:

I do not believe that Joseph A. Skrzynski (plaintiff) established general causation, i.e., that exposure to chrysotile asbestos as a component of friction products can cause peritoneal mesothelioma, nor did plaintiff meet his burden of proof on specific causation, i.e., that he was exposed to sufficient levels of chrysotile asbestos to cause peritoneal mesothelioma. Thus, in my view, there is “no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences [that] could possibly lead rational people to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial,” and the verdict should be set aside on the ground that it is not supported by legally sufficient evidence … . Skrzynski v Akebono Brake Corp., 2025 NY Slip Op 04322, Fourth Dept 7-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision and the dissent for insight into the proof requirements for general and specific causation in a toxic torts action. Plaintiff must prove the toxin (asbsestos in this case) is capable of causing the disease (mesothelioma in this case) and the toxin in fact caused plaintiff’s disease.

 

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