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FAILURE TO REJECT A LATE ANSWER WITHIN 15 DAYS WAIVES LATE SERVICE AND THE DEFAULT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff waived any objection to late service of the answer by not rejecting it within 15 days:

Pursuant to CPLR 2101(f), “[t]he party on whom a paper is served shall be deemed to have waived objection to any defect in form unless, within fifteen days after the receipt thereof, the party on whom the paper is served returns the paper to the party serving it with a statement of particular objections” … . Here, the plaintiff’s undisputed failure to reject [the] answer within the 15-day statutory time frame constituted a waiver of the late service and the default … . Moreover, the plaintiff did not move for leave to enter a default judgment against [defendants] … . Therefore, the Supreme Court should not have rejected the answer … .Globalized Realty Group, LLC v Crossroad Realty NY, LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 03797, Second Dept 6-25-25

Practice Point: Failure to reject a late answer following the procedure in CPLR 2101(1) waives late service and the default.

 

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