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DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT MOVING TO SUPPRESS CREDIT CARDS SEIZED DURING THE EXECUTION OF A SEARCH WARRANT WHICH WERE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE WARRANT; THE INCRIMINATING NATURE OF THE CREDIT CARDS WAS NOT IMMEDIATELEY APPARENT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined defense counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress credit cards seized during the execution of a search warrant. The credit cards were not within the scope of the warrant and there was no showing the incriminating nature of the credit cards was immediately apparent to the officer who seized them:

… [I]n an affirmation in support of the defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion, trial counsel averred that he “failed to consider that the seized credit cards were not described in the search warrant” and that he “failed to research the applicable law on exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Trial counsel admitted that his subsequent failure to move to suppress the credit cards in particular was not the result of a strategic decision and that he would have so moved if he had researched the law concerning the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, by his own admission, trial counsel’s failure to move for suppression of the credit cards due to their warrantless seizure cannot be characterized as a legitimate strategic decision … .

Defense counsel’s “investigation of the law, the facts, and the issues that are relevant to the case” is “[e]ssential to any representation, and to the attorney’s consideration of the best course of action on behalf of the client” … . Since the defendant established that trial counsel “did not fully investigate the case and did not collect the type of information that a lawyer would need in order to determine the best course of action” …  he demonstrated that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Thus, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction on this basis and ordered a new trial. People v Goodluck, 2025 NY Slip Op 03343, Second Dept 6-4-25

Practice Point: Here defense counsel’s failure to investigate the law regarding the seizure of evidence outside the scope of a search warrant was deemed ineffective assistance requiring a new trial. Note that defense counsel, in support of defendant’s motion, submitted an affirmation admitting the failure to investigate and acknowledging that the omission was not a deliberate defense strategy.

 

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