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IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT CASE, PLAINTIFF BROUGHT THE ACTION IN AN IMPROPER VENUE; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE WAS SIX DAYS LATE; SUPREME COURT IMPROVIDENTLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion to change venue in this traffic-accident case should have been granted. Plaintiff had brought the action in an improper venue. Although the defendants’ motion to change venue was six days late, Supreme Court had the discretion to grant it:

CPLR 510 sets forth grounds on which a motion to change venue may be made. When a defendant moves to change venue on the ground that the venue selected by the plaintiff is not proper … , the defendant must serve a timely demand on the plaintiff prior to making the motion … . When a motion to change venue on this ground is untimely, the motion is addressed to the court’s discretion rather than based on right … . Here, the defendants acknowledge that, after serving a demand to change venue with their answer, they moved to change the venue of the action six days late. Thus, their motion “became one addressed to the court’s discretion” … .

Under the circumstances present here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 510 to change the venue of the action from Kings County to Suffolk County. Venue is proper “in the county in which one of the parties resided when [the action] was commenced; [or] the county in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred ” … . Here, there is no dispute that none of the parties resided in Kings County and that the accident did not occur in Kings County. By selecting an improper venue in the first instance, the plaintiff forfeited the right to choose venue … . Further, the plaintiff failed to show that the county specified by the defendants was improper and did not cross-move to retain venue in Kings County or to transfer venue to a county other than that urged by the defendants … . Moreover, although the defendants’ motion was untimely, they promptly moved to change the venue of the action after confirming the true location of the accident … . Pujals v Haitidis, 2025 NY Slip Op 03213, Second Dept 5-28-25

Practice Point: Plaintiff brought the action in an improper venue. Defendants’ motion to change venue was six days late. Under the facts, Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion when it denied defendants’ motion.

 

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