You are here: / / Criteria for Liability for Lead Paint Exposure Described
, ,

Criteria for Liability for Lead Paint Exposure Described

Reversing Supreme Court, the Second Department determined defendants in a lead paint case failed to demonstrate they did not have notice of the dangerous condition.  The court explained the relevant criteria:

Under New York common law, a landowner “has a duty to maintain his or her premises in a reasonably safe condition” … . “[I]n order for a landlord to be held liable for injuries resulting from a defective condition upon the premises, the plaintiff must establish that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of the condition for such a period of time that, in the exercise of reasonable care, it should have been corrected” … . Constructive notice of a hazardous lead-based paint condition may be established by proof “that the landlord (1) retained a right of entry to the premises and assumed a duty to make repairs, (2) knew that the apartment was constructed at a time before lead-based interior paint was banned, (3) was aware that paint was peeling on the premises, (4) knew of the hazards of lead-based paint to young children, and (5) knew that a young child lived in the apartment” … . Greene v Mullen, 2015 NY Slip Op 02729, 2nd Dept 4-1-15

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH FATHER FAILED TO APPEAR IN THE CUSTODY PROCEEDING, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING AND MADE FINDINGS OF FACT; CUSTODY ORDER VACATED AND MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
BASED UPON THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM, DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENT AT THE IN CAMERA INTERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY-RAPE COMPLAINANT TO DETERMINE THE RELEVANCE OF HER PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY (A MATERIAL STAGE OF THIS PROCEEDING); DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT FOR WHICH NO 710.30 NOTICE WAS PROVIDED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED; THE MOLINEUX EVIDENCE OF INTENT, MOTIVE, OR LACK OF MISTAKE WAS NOT RELEVANT TO STATUTORY RAPE (SECOND DEPT).
FATHER’S VISITATION RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED WITHOUT A HEARING, UNTESTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES NOT SUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).
THE JUDGE’S SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A STATUS CONFERENCE ORDER REVERSED; A JUDGE’S POWER TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT, SUA SPONTE, IS LIMITED AND SHOULD BE USED SPARINGLY (SECOND DEPT).
THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 OR THE MORTGAGE AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
ROBBERY CONVICTION UNSUPPORTED BY PROOF OF INTENT TO PERMANENTLY, AS OPPOSED TO TEMPORARILY, DEPRIVE OWNER OF PROPERTY; HEARING NECESSARY TO ASSESS DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY TRIAL ARGUMENTS; PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL.
PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A PIECE OF A BUILDING FACADE WHICH CAME LOOSE; PLAINTIFF SUED TWO DEFENDANTS WHO HAD DONE WORK IN THE ROADWAY NEAR THE BUILDING, ALLEGING THE EXCAVATION LOOSENED THE FACADE MATERIAL; DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Father’s Consent to Adoption Not Required

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Defense Counsel’s Absence When Judge Decided to Replace a Sick Juror Not... Appellate Division Should Have Allowed Respondent to Answer Petition After Dismissal...