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DEFENDANT’S STEPMOTHER COULD NOT CONSENT TO THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S BACKPACK, WHICH WAS IN THE STEPMOTHER’S APARTMENT, BECAUSE THE POLICE KNEW THE BACKPACK BELONGED TO DEFENDANT; AN APPELLATE COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AFFIRM A LOWER COURT RULING ON A GROUND NOT RULED ON BY THE LOWER COURT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court and dismissing the indictment, determined defendant’s motion to suppress a firearm seized from a backpack should have been granted. The police knew the backpack, which was in his stepmother’s apartment, belonged to the defendant. Therefore defendant’s stepmother could not consent to the search. That First Department noted that the arguments raised by the People for the first time on appeal (defendant had abandoned the backpack and the emergency exception to the warrant requirement applied) could not be considered because the lower court did not rule on them (a prerequisite for appellate jurisdiction):

Supreme Court incorrectly denied defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence recovered from defendant’s bag based on his stepmother’s consent to search her apartment … . The testimony at the hearing was explicit that the officer conducting the search knew that the bag belonged to defendant and not defendant’s stepmother before he picked it up and felt what he believed to be a firearm inside. Therefore, she did not “possess[] common authority over . . . [the] effects sought to be inspected”—here, defendant’s backpack—and could not consent to a search of it … .

While the People argue, in the alternative, that defendant was trespassing and abandoned the bag when he left it in the apartment to surrender himself to the police, they did not advance this argument before the suppression court, and they are foreclosed from doing so now … . The same is true of their argument that search of the bag was permissible under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement … . Furthermore, the hearing court did not rule on these issues in denying suppression, “and therefore did not rule adversely against defendant on this point” … . Thus, this Court “lacks jurisdiction to affirm the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress” the firearm on this alternative ground … . People v Gonzalez, 2025 NY Slip Op 02883, First Dept 5-13-25

Practice Point: Here defendant’s backpack was in defendant’s stepmother’s apartment. The police knew the backpack belonged to defendant. Therefore defendant’s stepmother could not consent to the search of the back pack.​

Practice Point: Here the People sought to affirm the lower court’s denial of the suppression motion on grounds which where not raised or ruled upon by the motion court. The appellate court does not have jurisdiction to affirm on a ground not ruled upon by the lower court.

 

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