Stray Remarks Doctrine Applied in Action Under New York City Human Rights Law

The First Department determined that the “stray remarks doctrine” applied to actions brought brought under the New York City Human Rights Law.  The court rejected the argument that a statement in an email written weeks after plaintiff’s termination was actionable, asserting the so-called “stray remarks doctrine:”

Plaintiff relies on one remark made in an email exchange that took place weeks after the decision to terminate him was made and that concerned the resolution of his union’s grievance following the termination. In the email, one of defendant’s employees responsible for making the decision to terminate plaintiff declined to reconsider the penalty because of the nature of plaintiff’s convictions and his concern about the liability that defendant would assume if plaintiff committed a similar crime while on company time. However, “[s]tray remarks such as [this], even if made by a decision maker, do not, without more, constitute evidence of discrimination” … .  Indeed, plaintiff did not demonstrate a nexus between the employee’s remark and the decision to terminate him… .

We decline to hold, as urged by plaintiff and amici, that the stray remarks doctrine may not be relied on in determining claims brought pursuant to the City Human Rights Law, even as we recognize the law’s “uniquely broad and remedial purposes” (Bennett, 92 AD3d at 34 [internal quotation marks omitted]). The doctrine is not inconsistent with the intentions of the law, since statements “constitute evidence of discriminatory motivation when a plaintiff demonstrates that a nexus exists between the allegedly discriminatory statements and a defendant’s decision to discharge the plaintiff” … . Godbolt v Verizon NY Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 01561, 1st Dept 3-11-14