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DEFENDANT’S EXPERT AFFIDAVIT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION DID NOT ADDRESS SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS ASSERTED BY PLAINTIFFS; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant surgeon was not entitled to summary judgment in this medical malpractice action. The defendant’s expert affidavit did not address specific allegations of negligence asserted by plaintiffs:

… [T]he defendants failed to establish .. that Ashraf [defendant] did not depart from the applicable standard of care in treating the injured plaintiff or that any such departure did not proximately cause the injured plaintiff’s injuries. An expert affidavit of Ashraf submitted by the defendants in support of their motion failed to address specific allegations of negligence asserted by the plaintiffs, including whether Ashraf departed from the applicable standard of care in placing a 14-millimeter polyethylene component during the September 2016 surgery, as opposed to a smaller size, and whether such departure was a proximate cause of the injured plaintiff’s injuries … . Sanchez v Ashraf, 2025 NY Slip Op 02803, Second Dept 5-7-25

Practice Point: Summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice action is dependent upon the defense expert’s affidavit. If the affidavit fails to address specific allegations of negligence made by the the plaintiff, summary judgment is not warranted. This is a fairly common ground for reversal.

 

 

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