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HERE THE EVIDENCE WAS PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL; DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A CIRCUMSTANTIAL-EVIDENCE JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED ON THE MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER CHARGES (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, ordering a new trial on the murder and attempted murder charges, determined the judge should have given the circumstantial-evidence jury instruction:

“[A] trial court must grant a defendant’s request for a circumstantial evidence charge when the proof of the defendant’s guilt rests solely on circumstantial evidence . . . By contrast, where there is both direct and circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt, such a charge need not be given” … .

The People argue that certain statements made by defendant provided some direct evidence of defendant’s guilt of those charges. A defendant’s “statement[s are] direct evidence only if [they] constitute a relevant admission of guilt” … . Here, we conclude that the statements identified by the People were not admissions of guilt; rather, because they “merely includ[ed] inculpatory acts from which a jury may or may not infer guilt, the statement[s were] circumstantial and not direct evidence” … . The People thus failed to present ” ‘both direct and circumstantial evidence of . . . defendant’s guilt’ ” that would have negated the need for a circumstantial evidence charge … . People v Rodriguez, 2025 NY Slip Op 02454, Fourth Dept 4-25-25

Practice Point: Where the evidence against a defendant is both circumstantial and direct, a request for a circumstantial-evidence jury instruction is properly denied. Where the evidence is purely circumstantial, the request must be granted.​

Practice Point: A defendant’s statements are direct evidence only if they constitute an admission of guilt. Where, as here, the statements include inculpatory acts from which guilt can be inferred the statements constitute circumstantial evidence.

 

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