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PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL AS HE WALKED THROUGH A “ROOM,” NOT A “PASSAGEWAY;” THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION PROHIBITING OBSTRUCTIONS IN A “PASSAGEWAY” SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action based on an Industrial Code regulation requiring passageways be kept free of obstructions did not apply to the room where plaintiff tripped and fell:

… [P]laintiff testified that while he was walking through a room, he slipped upon and became tangled in a portion of a plastic tarp that was covering a pool table that extended past the table onto the floor, causing him to fall. * * *

… [D]efendants established, prima facie, that 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(1), which requires owners and general contractors, among other things, to keep all passageways free of obstructions that could cause tripping, is inapplicable, because the site where the plaintiff allegedly fell was not a passageway … . Bittrolff v City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 02307, Second Dept 4-23-25

Practice Point: For purposes of Labor Law 241(6) which bases liability on a violation of the Industrial Code, an Industrial Code provision prohibiting obstructions and tripping hazards in a “passageway” does not apply to obstructions and tripping hazards in a “room.”​

 

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