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THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN PLAINTIFF COULD HAVE DISCOVERED THE ALLEGED FRAUD WHICH INDUCED HIM TO SIGN RELEASES; THEREFORE THIS FRUAD-BASED ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED; THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT AND FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant school in this Child Victims Act case (1) did not demonstrate the fraud-based causes of action to set aside or rescind the releases signed by the plaintiff were time-barred and (2) was not entitled to dismissal of the fraudulent inducement and fraudulent concealment causes of action. Plaintiff alleged he would not have signed the releases had he known the guidance counsellor who allegedly sexually abused him would be allowed to continue in his employment, and he would not have signed the releases had he known there were other instances of sexual misconduct by the guidance counsellor of which the school was aware:  With respect to the statute of limitations for a fraud-based action, the court explained:

“A fraud-based action must be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it, whichever is later” (… see CPLR 203[g]; 213[8]). “The inquiry as to whether a plaintiff could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud turns on whether the plaintiff was possessed of knowledge of facts from which the fraud could be reasonably inferred” … . “Generally, knowledge of the fraudulent act is required and mere suspicion will not constitute a sufficient substitute. Where it does not conclusively appear that a plaintiff had knowledge of facts from which the fraud could reasonably be inferred, a [fraud-based cause of action] should not be dismissed on motion and the question should be left to the trier of facts” … . “Ordinarily, an inquiry into when a plaintiff should have discovered an alleged fraud presents a mixed question of law and fact” … .

Here, the defendant failed to establish that the causes of action to set aside or rescind the releases on the ground of fraud were time-barred pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) … . “[T]here was no indication in the [amended complaint] or in the papers submitted by the defendant[ ] on [its] motion as to when the plaintiff became aware” of the alleged fraudulent conduct … . In any event, the plaintiff, in affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion, indicated that he learned of certain facts underlying the fraud-based causes of action in early 2021 … . The defendant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff, by exercising reasonable diligence, could have discovered those facts at some point prior to the two-year period immediately preceding the commencement of this action … . Gormley v Marist Bros. of the Schs., Province of the United States of Am., 2025 NY Slip Op 01612, Second Dept 3-19-25

Practice Point: Here defendant did not demonstrate when plaintiff could or should have become aware of the defendant’s alleged fraud. Therefore the motion to dismiss the fraud-based action as time-barred should not have been granted.

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of what must be alleged to state causes of action for fraudulent inducement and fraudulent concealment in the context of setting aside or rescinding a release.

 

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