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PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER IN DEFENDANT MC RAE’S VEHICLE WHEN MC RAE’S VEHICLE WAS STRUCK FROM BEHIND; THE ALLEGATION THAT MC RAE STOPPED FOR NO APPARENT REASON RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER MC CRAE WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT; COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE WILL PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO CROSS CLAIMS BETWEEN DEFENDANTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant driver’s (McRae’s) motion for summary judgment in this rear-end collision case should not have been granted. Plaintiff was a passenger in defendant McRae’s vehicle. McRae alleged his vehicle was stopped when it was struck by defendant NYC Transit Authority’s (NYCTA’s) bus (driven by defendant Pena). Defendants NYCTA and Pena alleged McRae stopped his vehicle for no apparent reason raising a question of fact about whether defendant McRae was comparatively negligent. Comparative negligence will preclude summary judgment with respect to cross claims between defendants:

… [T]he plaintiff established, prima facie, that NYCTA and Pena were negligent. In support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted, inter alia, the transcript of his deposition testimony, which demonstrated that the bus Pena was operating struck McRae’s stopped vehicle in the rear. In opposition, the NYCTA defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The NYCTA defendants submitted, among other things, an affidavit in which Pena averred that McRae made a right turn into the path of the bus and began to move forward, but then stopped short. In essence, this explanation amounts to nothing more than a claim that McRae’s vehicle came to a sudden stop which, without more, failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to NYCTA and Pena’s liability … .

The Supreme Court should have denied that branch of McRae’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing all cross claims insofar as asserted against him. In support of his motion, McRae submitted his affidavit, in which he averred that his vehicle, while stopped at a red light, was struck in the rear by the bus operated by Pena. Thus, McRae established, prima facie, that Pena was solely at fault in the happening of the accident … . In opposition, however, the NYCTA defendants raised a triable issue of fact as to whether McRae was comparatively at fault in the happening of the accident because he stopped suddenly for no apparent reason … . Thompson v New York City Tr. Auth., 2022 NY Slip Op 05052, Second Dept 8-24-22

Practice Point: Plaintiff was a passenger in defendant McRae’s car which was struck from behind by a NYC Transit Authority (NYCTA) bus. Defendant NYCTA raised a question fact about Mc Rae’s comparative negligence by alleging Mc Rae stopped suddenly for no apparent reason. Comparative negligent will preclude summary judgment with respect to cross-claims between defendants.

 

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