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PLAINTIFF, A CANISIUS COLLEGE STUDENT IN 2020, DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT BASED ON THE SHIFT FROM IN-PERSON TO REMOTE LEARNING BECAUSE OF COVID (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, affirming Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff did not state a cause of action for breach of contract based on the cessation of in-person classes at Canisius College during COVID:

Plaintiff contends on his appeal that the court erred in granting the motion insofar as it sought to dismiss the breach of contract cause of action to the extent it sought recovery of the tuition he paid to Canisius for the spring 2020 semester. “New York courts have long recognized that the relationship between a university and its students is contractual in nature . . . , and that specific promises set forth in a school’s bulletins, circulars and handbooks, which are material to the student’s relationship to the school, can establish the existence of an implied contract” (Rynasko v New York Univ., 63 F4th 186, 197 [2d Cir 2023] …). Here, however, we reject plaintiff’s contention because “the amended complaint contains only conclusory allegations of an implied contract to provide exclusively in-person learning during the spring 2020 semester which are unsupported by any specific promise that is material to” plaintiff’s relationship with Canisius … . We agree with the Second Department that, in this context, the cause of action for breach of contract requires an allegation of “a specific promise to provide the plaintiff with exclusively in-person learning” … . The amended complaint also fails to state, in anything more than a conclusory fashion, the manner in which plaintiff’s unspecified course of study was impacted by Canisius’s shift to remote operations … . McCudden v Canisius Coll., 2025 NY Slip Op 01539, Fourth Dept 3-14-25

 

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