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A CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING LEGAL MALPRACTICE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a cause of action alleging legal malpractice should not have been dismissed:

… [T]he complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action alleging legal malpractice. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession by filing a second amended complaint which deleted the majority of the factual allegations and legal malpractice causes of action the plaintiff had interposed against the defendant in the underlying action without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent. The complaint further alleged that the defendants’ negligence in amending that pleading proximately caused the plaintiff to lose his claims of legal malpractice against the defendant in the underlying action, and to incur additional legal fees to appeal the denial of his motion for leave to amend the second amended complaint. Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the plaintiff alleged actual, ascertainable damages that resulted from the defendants’ negligence … . Ofman v Richland, 2025 NY Slip Op 00327, Second Dept 1-22-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a concise description of the elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice.

 

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