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THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST “ASSISTED LIVING” AS OPPOSED TO “RESIDENTIAL HEALTH CARE” FACILITIES; COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMSSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, affirming Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Egan, determined the Public Health Law does not create a right of private action against an “assisted living facility” as opposed to a “residential health care facility.” Here the plaintiff attempted to sue the defendant assisted living facility for alleged deficiencies and the complaint was properly dismissed:

Public Health Law § 2801-d creates a private right of action distinct from traditional claims for medical malpractice and negligence, and it provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny residential health care facility that deprives any patient of said facility of any right or benefit, as hereinafter defined [in Public Health Law article 28], shall be liable to [the] patient for injuries suffered as a result of said deprivation” (Public Health Law § 2801-d [1] …). A residential health care facility is defined, in turn, as “a nursing home or a facility providing health-related service” (Public Health Law § 2801 [3]; see Public Health Law § 2801 [4] [b]).

An assisted living facility, in contrast, is governed by Public Health Law article 46-B instead of Public Health Law article 28, being defined as a facility that “provides or arranges for housing, on-site monitoring, and personal care services and/or home care services (either directly or indirectly), in a home-like setting to five or more adult residents unrelated to the assisted living provider” (Public Health Law § 4651 [1]). DeRusso v Church Aid of the Prot. Episcopal Church in the Town of Saratoga Springs, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 00008, Third Dept 1-2-25

Practice Point: The statutory private right of action created by the Public Health Law for suits against “residential health care facilities” does not apply to “assisted living facilities.”

 

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