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A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO DEFENDANT IN A POLICE REPORT TO THE EFFECT THAT PLAINTIFF STOPPED SUDDENLY DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on liability in this rear-end collision case. The court noted that evidence the car in which plaintiff was a passenger stopped suddenly was not enough to raise a question of fact:

“A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, requiring that operator to come forward with evidence of a nonnegligent explanation for the collision in order to rebut the inference of negligence” … . “[A]n assertion that the lead vehicle came to a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle” … .

Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the vehicle owned by Elshaer and operated by Elnaggar struck Chowdhury’s vehicle in the rear, and in opposition, Elshaer and Elnaggar failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Contrary to Elshaer and Elnaggar’s contention, although a police report recounted Elnaggar’s statement that Chowdhury’s vehicle stopped suddenly prior to the rear-end collision, this statement was insufficient, in and of itself, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for the happening of the collision … . Chowdhury v Elshaer, 2024 NY Slip Op 06603, Second Dept 12-24-24

Practice Point: Here a statement attributed to defendant in a police report to the effect that plaintiff stopped suddenly was not sufficient to raise a question of fact about whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for the rear-end collision.

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