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THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEVER THE CHARGES RELATING TO TWO SEPARATE MURDERS, COMMITTED NEARLY TWO YEARS APART, WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION; DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE JURY WOULD HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY CONSIDERING SEPARATELY THE PROOF FOR EACH OFFENSE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming defendant’s murder convictions, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over two comprehensive dissenting opinions, determined the denial of defendant’s motion to sever the charges relating to two separate murders, committed nearly two years apart, was not error:

The first victim was the defendant’s roommate, who was found dead in their shared apartment in 2013 after a fire that occurred under circumstances that later raised questions about her cause of death. The second victim was a woman whom defendant had hired to go on a date with him in December 2014; her body was found in a shallow grave in May 2015. The defendant was arrested in 2017 … . * * *

Where counts have been joined under CPL 200.20 (2) (c), the CPL provides that the trial court has discretion to sever them if doing so would be “in the interest of justice and for good cause shown” (id. 200.20 [3]). This provision has its origins in a 1936 amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure that allowed joinder of “two or more acts or transactions constituting crimes of the same or a similar character which are neither connected together nor parts of a common scheme or plan” … .

The statute specifies two situations that establish good cause: first, where there is “[s]ubstantially more proof on one or more such joinable offenses than on others and there is a substantial likelihood that the jury would be unable to consider separately the proof as it relates to each offense”; and second, where there is “[a] convincing showing that a defendant has both important testimony to give concerning one count and a genuine need to refrain from testifying on the other, which satisfies the court that the risk of prejudice is substantial” … . The statute expressly notes that good cause is not limited to these grounds … , and we have explained that “a defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial free of undue prejudice” must be protected when offenses are joined for trial … . …

… The defendant asserts that “the jury was incapable of considering the proof separately with respect to each offense” because the proof of each crime was “markedly different” and “dissimilar.” … [But] the key question is whether it would be difficult for the jury to consider separately the proof for each offense … . People v Mero, 2024 NY Slip Op 06385, CtApp 12-19-24

Practice Point: Consult this opinion, especially the extensive dissents, for a comprehensive discussion of the issues raised by trying a defendant for two unrelated murders, separated by years, in a single trial.

 

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