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You are here: Home1 / Criminal Law2 / DEFENDANT’S CROSSING THE FOG LINE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY...
Criminal Law, Evidence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

DEFENDANT’S CROSSING THE FOG LINE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY THREE TIMES IN SECONDS CONSTITUTED PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE TRAFFIC STOP (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined there was probable cause for the traffic stop which resulted in a DWI conviction. Defendant’s car crossed the fog line on the right side of the roadway three times within seconds:

When a driver swerves over the fog line repeatedly, in quick succession, they have failed to “drive[ ] as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane” in violation of VTL § 1128 (a) (see e.g. Schoonmaker v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 33 NY3d 926, 928 [2019] [testimony that vehicle “ma(de) an erratic movement off the right side of the road, crossing the fog line and moving off the shoulder with the vehicle’s right front tire” provided substantial evidence that stop was lawful under VTL § 1128 (a)]; People v Tandle, 71 AD3d 1176, 1177, 1178 [2d Dept 2010]; People v Parris, 26 AD3d 393, 394 [2d Dept 2006]; cf. People v Davis, 58 AD3d 896, 898 [3d Dept 2009] [police officer’s testimony that driver had made “brief contacts with the fog line,” but not that driver was, for example, “weaving, driving erratically or even that he drove onto the shoulder” was insufficient to support traffic stop under VTL § 1128 (a)]). On these facts, the troopers’ observations, which were credited by the suppression court, established probable cause for the traffic stop. Therefore, the court properly denied the motion to suppress. People v Rufus, 2024 NY Slip Op 06384, CtApp 12-19-24

Practice Point: Here defendant’s crossing the fog line on the right side of the highway three times in seconds violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law and constituted probable cause for the traffic stop.

 

December 19, 2024
Tags: Court of Appeals
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-12-19 18:41:432024-12-19 18:41:43DEFENDANT’S CROSSING THE FOG LINE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY THREE TIMES IN SECONDS CONSTITUTED PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE TRAFFIC STOP (CT APP).
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