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AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING THE PEOPLE FAILED TO PROVE THE LEGALITY OF THE TRAFFIC STOP, WHICH WAS BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S MAKING U-TURNS, AND THE SUPPRESSION MOTION WAS GRANTED; THE PEOPLE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO REARGUE THE MOTION AND PRESENT EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE U-TURNS WERE, IN FACT, ILLEGAL (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Term, determined the judge in this DWI prosecution should not have granted the People’s motion to reargue the suppression motion. The court had initially granted defendant’s motion to suppress because the People failed to prove U-turns made by the defendant were illegal. When the suppression motion was reargued, the People presented evidence the U-turns were, in fact, illegal and the court denied suppression:

… [I]f the People have had a full and fair opportunity to oppose suppression, and the suppression court has issued a ruling on the merits, the People may not have an additional “opportunity to shore up their evidentiary or legal position” … . Under the circumstances of this case, where the People were unprepared for the suppression hearing and sought to reargue the legal issue to remedy their lack of preparedness, the same principle should apply.

At a suppression hearing, the People bear the burden of showing the legality of the police conduct in the first instance … . Here, the court granted defendant’s motion for suppression because the People failed to demonstrate that defendant’s U-turns were illegal and therefore that the stop was lawful. Neither the Assistant District Attorney nor the arresting officer could identify any traffic law provision violated by defendant. Moreover, the People did not request a recess or adjournment to determine the statutory basis for the stop, nor did they request permission to furnish a post-hearing submission to identify any relevant provision of law. Instead, the People returned a month after the court granted suppression, offering a different legal theory that they had not raised at the original suppression hearing. On that new legal theory, the court changed course and denied defendant’s motion to suppress.

Of course, “[b]efore sentence is imposed, trial courts in criminal cases have the general inherent authority to correct their own mistakes” … , which may include granting leave to reargue. Although the People may be permitted to reargue the legal or factual issues of the suppression proceedings, allowing the suppression court to grant the People’s motion to reargue in these circumstances would run afoul of our “full and fair opportunity” principle and the policies of finality and judicial efficiency underlying it. People v Lawson, 2024 NY Slip Op 06238, CtApp 12-12-24

Practice Pont: As a general rule, the People should have only one chance to demonstrate the legality of a traffic stop in the context of a suppression hearing. Once a suppression motion is granted, the People should not be allowed to reopen the hearing to present evidence which could have been presented the first time around.

 

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