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PLAINTIFFS RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE APPLIED TO RENDER THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE CAUSES OF ACTION TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether the continuous representation doctrine applied to render legal malpractice causes of action timely:

The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging legal malpractice is three years (see CPLR 214[6]). “However, causes of action alleging legal malpractice which would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations are timely if the doctrine of continuous representation applies” … . “For the continuous representation doctrine to apply, there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney which often includes an attempt by the attorney to rectify an alleged act of malpractice” … . “[A] person [is not] expected to jeopardize his [or her] pending case or his [or her] relationship with the attorney handling that case during the period that the attorney continues to represent the person. Since it is impossible to envision a situation where commencing a malpractice suit would not affect the professional relationship, the rule of continuous representation tolls the running of the Statute of Limitations on the malpractice claim until the ongoing representation is completed” … . Dellwood Dev., Ltd. v Coffinas Law Firm, PLLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 06184, Second Dept 12-11-24

Practice Point: Here there were questions of fact whether the continuous representation doctrine applied to render the legal malpractice causes of action timely.

 

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THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE, ASSIGNED... HERE AN OTHERWISE UNTIMELY COUNTERCLAIM WAS RENDERED TIMELY PURSUANT TO CPLR...