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THE ORDER OF FACT-FINDING IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; THE STREET STOP WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION; AND THE SHOWUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE WAS UNDULY SUGGESTIVE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing the order of disposition in this juvenile delinquency proceeding, determined the order of fact-finding was against the weight of the evidence, the appellant was stopped by the police in the absence of reasonable suspicion, and the victim’s identification of the appellant should have been suppressed. The victim was struck from behind and saw only the backs of the assailants’ heads. The identification was made from a police car at a distance of 240 feet, and the show-up identification procedure was unduly suggestive:

… [W]hile the complainant initially claimed that he had a momentary opportunity to see his alleged assailants’ faces after he stood up, he later acknowledged that he merely observed “the backs of their heads” as they fled. Moreover, the credibility of the complainant’s testimony was undermined by his claim to have been able to identify the appellant during a showup identification procedure from a significant distance in the backseat of a police car using only one eye. * * *

… [T]he testimony presented at the suppression hearing established that the police, using two police cars, stopped the appellant and two companions because they fit the general description given by the complainant of “black male[ ]” “youths” riding bicycles. The presentment agency did not present any evidence at the suppression hearing that the appellant and his companions were engaged in any suspicious behavior at the time of the police stop. Moreover, at the time of the police stop, the appellant was with only two companions, which conflicted with the complainant’s description of “five youths.” Under these circumstances, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing was insufficient to establish that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the appellant … . * * *

Wayne Bowman, a police officer who accompanied the complainant during the showup identification procedure, testified at the suppression hearing that he assured the complainant that “[w]e’re far enough back they’re not going to be able to see you” and acknowledged that he and the complainant were positioned about the distance of “[a] football field” away from the appellant and his companions during the showup identification procedure. Moreover, the complainant acknowledged at the suppression hearing that prior to the showup identification procedure, Bowman told him that the police “had stopped people that fit the description.” Under these circumstances, the Family Court improperly determined that the showup identification procedure was reasonable and not unduly suggestive … . Matter of Ahmand T., 2024 NY Slip Op 06051, Second Dept 12-4-24

Practice Point: The identification-evidence in this juvenile delinquency proceeding was too weak to support the order of disposition.

Practice Point: The street stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion.

Practice Point: The showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive.

 

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