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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / CPLR 3216 IS A FORGIVING STATUTE WHICH ALLOWS BUT DOES NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL...
Civil Procedure, Judges

CPLR 3216 IS A FORGIVING STATUTE WHICH ALLOWS BUT DOES NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A 90-DAY NOTICE; HERE PLAINTIFFS PRESENTED AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE AND DEMONSTRATED THE ACTION HAS MERIT; THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint should not have been dismissed on “neglect to proceed” grounds after plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the 90-day notice:

“CPLR 3216 is an extremely forgiving statute which never requires, but merely authorizes, the Supreme Court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action based on the plaintiff’s unreasonable neglect to proceed” … . In opposition to a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3216, a plaintiff may still avoid dismissal if he or she demonstrates “a justifiable excuse for the failure to timely abide by the 90-day demand, as well as the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action” … . “Thus, even when all of the statutory preconditions are met, including plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 90-day requirement, plaintiff has yet another opportunity to salvage the action simply by opposing the motion to dismiss with a justifiable excuse” and proof of a potentially meritorious cause of action … .

Here, the plaintiffs’ belief that the action remained stayed in the absence of some affirmative act by the Supreme Court, although erroneous, constituted a justifiable excuse under the circumstances for their failure to respond to the defendant’s 90-day notice. Notably, the 90-day notice was sent only three months after the stay had been lifted, and the record does not otherwise contain evidence of a pattern of persistent neglect or delay in prosecuting the action or an intent to abandon the action … . Furthermore, the plaintiffs established the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action sounding in strict products liability … . Holness v Gigglesworld Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 06031, Second Dept 12-4-24

Practice Point: CPLR 3216 is a forgiving statute which allows but does not require the dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with a 90-day notice. Here plaintiffs presented an adequate excuse and demonstrated a meritorious cause of action. The complaint should not have been dismissed.

 

December 4, 2024
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-12-04 10:27:042024-12-08 10:43:18CPLR 3216 IS A FORGIVING STATUTE WHICH ALLOWS BUT DOES NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A 90-DAY NOTICE; HERE PLAINTIFFS PRESENTED AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE AND DEMONSTRATED THE ACTION HAS MERIT; THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
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PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVE DEFENDANT OWNER OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS PROPERLY... THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DENIED THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE ARTICLE 78 PETITION/COMPLAINT...
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