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INSTALLING ELECTRIC CABLES IS CONSTRUCTION WORK WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 241(6); PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS STRUCK IN THE EYE BY A CABLE, SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATED THE EYE-PROTECTION-EQUIPMENT REGULATION IN THE INDUSTRIAL CODE APPLIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant, Kamco, was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law 241(6) cause of action. Plaintiff (Lopez) alleged he was struck in the eye by an electrical cable as he was attempting to connect it. Plaintiff (Lopez) alleged Kamco violated the Industrial Code by failing to provide eye-protection equipment:

“‘[T]he courts have generally held that the scope of Labor Law § 241(6) is governed by 12 NYCRR 23-1.4(b)(13), which defines construction work expansively. Under that regulation, construction work consists of [a]ll work of the types performed in the construction, erection, alteration, repair, maintenance, painting or moving of buildings or other structures'” … . Construction work pursuant to 12 NYCRR 23-1.4(b)(13) may include “the work of hoisting, land clearing, earth moving, grading, excavating, trenching, pipe and conduit laying, road and bridge construction, concreting, . . . equipment installation and the structural installation of wood, metal, glass, plastic, masonry and other building materials in any form or for any purpose.”

… “In order to establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, a defendant must show that the plaintiff failed to identify a section of the Industrial Code that was allegedly violated, that any such section is insufficiently specific to support liability or is inapplicable to the facts of the case, or that the defendant complied with the requirements of the identified provision” … .

Here, since Lopez was engaged in the installation and furnishing of electrical cables, Kamco failed to establish, prima facie, that Labor Law § 241(6) was inapplicable to Lopez’s activities … . Kamco also failed to establish, prima facie, that 12 NYCRR 23-1.8(a) was inapplicable or that Lopez’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his alleged injuries, as Kamco failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether Lopez was engaged in work that might endanger the eyes, whether approved eye protection was provided to Lopez on the date of the accident, and whether Kamco’s failure to require Lopez to wear safety goggles was a proximate cause of his alleged injuries … . Lopez v Kamco Servs., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 05338, Second Dept 10-30-24

Practice Point: Installing electric cables is construction work covered by Labor Law 241(6).

Practice Point: The Industrial Code provision requiring eye-protection-equipment may apply to plaintiff here who was struck in the eye by an electric cable.

 

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