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THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS MANDATING ARBITRATION WERE PROPERLY ENFORCED BY SUPREME COURT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Oing, affirming Supreme Court, determined the contract provisions compelling arbitration should be enforced in this complex dispute among the owners and operators of nursing homes in Arizona. The terms of the contracts and the history of the litigation are far too detailed to fairly summarize here. Matter of Fein v Langer, 2024 NY Slip Op 04906, First Dept 10-8-24

Practice Point: In this case, the proverb cited in the opinion—“be careful what you wish for”—-means the contract provisions compelling arbitration controlled and the court litigation which had been commenced was precluded.

 

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Error to Exclude Petitioner from Arbitration Proceeding
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