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IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, PLAINTIFF’S AFFIANT DID NOT HAVE FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE MAILING PRACTICES OF THE PARTY RESPONSIBLE FOR MAILING THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE TO THE DEFENDANT; JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff in this foreclosure action did not prove the 90-day notice of foreclosure required by RPAPL 1304 was mailed to the defendant, a failure of proof which has been the ground for hundreds of reversals spanning many years:

… [P]laintiff proffered the affidavit of Trey Cook, a document execution specialist employed by the plaintiff’s loan servicer, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (hereinafter Nationstar), which was insufficient to establish compliance with RPAPL 1304. While Cook averred that he had personal knowledge of Nationstar’s business records and further averred that according to the business records he reviewed, 90-day notices were served via certified and first class mail at the mortgaged premises and last known address of the borrower, he did not attest that he was familiar with the standard office mailing procedures of Walz Group, Inc. (hereinafter Walz), the third-party vendor that apparently sent the RPAPL 1304 notices on behalf of the plaintiff. Thus, Cook’s affidavit did not establish proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed … . Further, Cook’s affidavit failed to address the nature of Nationstar’s relationship with Walz and whether Walz’s records were incorporated into Nationstar’s own records or routinely relied upon in its business … . Thus, Cook’s affidavit failed to lay a foundation for the admission of a transaction report generated by Walz (see CPLR 4518 [a] …). Finally, the tracking numbers on the copies of the 90-day notices submitted by the plaintiff, standing alone, did not suffice to establish, prima facie, proper mailing under RPAPL 1304 … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Palomaria, 2024 NY Slip Op 04374, Second Dept 9-11-24

Practice Point: In yet another reversal on this ground, plaintiff in this foreclosure action did not produce an affiant with first-hand knowledge of the mailing practices of the party responsible for mailing the RPAPL 1304 ninety-day notice of foreclosure to the defendant. Therefore the judgment of foreclosure was reversed.

 

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