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THE VEHICLE WHICH STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S STOPPED VEHICLE FROM BEHIND FLED THE SCENE BUT WAS IDENTIFIED BY A LICENSE PLATE FOUND AT THE SCENE; DEFENDANT ACKNOWLEDGED OWNERSHIP OF THE VEHICLE BUT DENIED OPERATING IT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT; THAT ALLEGATION DID NOT OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF PERMISSIVE USE UNDER THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW; PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this rear-end traffic-accident case, determined defendant’s allegation he was not driving his vehicle at the time of the accident did not overcome the presumption of permissive use under Vehicle and Traffic Law section 388(1). The vehicle which struck plaintiffs’ stopped vehicle fled the scene. But defendant admitted the license plate found at the scene was from his vehicle:

The plaintiff Manu Kanwar was a passenger in a vehicle owned and operated by the plaintiff Mahesh Kashyap when it was struck in the rear by another vehicle. Although the rear vehicle fled the scene, it allegedly was identified by its license plate, which had fallen off that vehicle at the accident scene. The plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in the accident. In his answer, the defendant, inter alia, admitted to owning a vehicle bearing the license plate number identified in the complaint, asserted an affirmative defense alleging that the plaintiffs were comparatively at fault, and asserted a counterclaim against Kashyap. * * *

The plaintiffs’ affidavits demonstrated, inter alia, that Kashyap’s vehicle was stopped for the traffic condition ahead when it was struck in the rear by the defendant’s vehicle and that the defendant, as the owner of the vehicle, was negligent (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 388, 1129[a] …). In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact. In his affidavit in opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion, the defendant merely averred that he was not operating his vehicle at the time of the accident. However, this was insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption of permissive use under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1)… , and it was also insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether his vehicle was not involved in the accident … . Kashyap v Dasilva, 2024 NY Slip Op 04308, Second Dept 8-28-24

Practice Point: Here the defendant acknowledged ownership of the vehicle which struck plaintiff’s stopped vehicle from behind and left the scene, but denied he was operating it at the time of the accident. That denial did not overcome the presumption that whoever was driving the vehicle was doing so with the owner’s permission (Vehicle and Traffic Law 388). Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment.

 

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