You are here: / / PLAINTIFF, IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT SEXUAL ABUSE ACTION, PROPERLY ASSERTED...
,

PLAINTIFF, IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT SEXUAL ABUSE ACTION, PROPERLY ASSERTED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS, CRITERIA EXPLAINED IN DEPTH (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt, determined the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) cause of action should not have been dismissed in this Child Victims Act sexual abuse case. Supreme Court held the IIED cause of action duplicated negligence causes of action. It was alleged that an employee of defendant church who coached a basketball team abused plaintiff, one of the players:

… [P]laintiff is asserting the IIED cause of action as an alternative claim to his negligence claims.

Thus … plaintiff is not barred from pursuing a cause of action for IIED.

… [T]he complaint states a cause of action for IIED. … [P]laintiff pleaded that defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct.

… [P]laintiff alleged that defendant knowingly permitted its employee, a child molester, to coach its youth basketball team, and defendant turned a blind eye to the abuse, allowing the employee to repeatedly subject plaintiff to inappropriate sexual contact. In doing so, defendant abused a position of dominance. Defendant, a trusted institution, enjoyed a position of dominance over plaintiff, a then-adolescent, who wanted to play on a prestigious youth basketball program that the church administered. Additionally, plaintiff, an adolescent coached by a church deacon, was especially vulnerable. Plaintiff’s vulnerability is highlighted by the allegations that defendant’s employee was permitted by defendant to be alone with plaintiff in a locker room where the sexual contact occurred. And defendant’s undesirable conduct was continuing; defendant retained and supervised the coach over the two-year period of abuse.

Crediting plaintiff’s allegations, … defendant facilitated manifestly inappropriate physical contact of a sexual nature by a known child molester by allowing him to coach its youth basketball team and providing the coach with ready access to potential child victims. That conduct … goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society …  We believe that an average member of the community would, upon reading the allegations in the complaint, find them to be outrageous … . Brown v Riverside Church in the City of N.Y., 2024 NY Slip Op 03927, First Dept 7-25-24

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an explanation of when a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, in addition to negligence causes of action, is allowed.

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for the criteria for an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action.

 

You might also like
To Demonstrate “Defamation by Implication” Where the Factual Statements Are Substantially True, It Must Be Shown the Communication as a Whole Imparts a Defamatory Inference and the Author Intended or Endorsed the Defamatory Inference
THE THREAT MADE BY DEFENDANT WAS PERSONAL IN NATURE AND WAS NOT DIRECTED AT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TERRORISM STATUTE (PENAL LAW 490.20); THE CONVICTION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT). ​
PLAINTIFF STARTED AN ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT IN NEW YORK; THEN DEFENDANT STARTED AN ACTION AGAINST PLAINTIFF IN ROMANIA; THE RESULTS OF THE ROMANIAN ACTION MAY BE DISPOSITIVE IN THE NEW YORK ACTION; THE NEW YORK ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE ROMANIAN ACTION, EVEN THOUGH THE NEW YORK ACTION WAS COMMENCED FIRST (FIRST DEPT).
Failure to Allege “Demand Futility” as Required Under Delaware Law Required Dismissal of the Derivative Causes of Action
SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD.
SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF’S HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS; THE CONDUCT OCCURRED WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PHYSICALLY IN NEW YORK AND DID NOT HAVE ANY IMPACT ON THE TERMS, CONDITIONS OR EXTENT OF HER EMPLOYMENT WITHIN NEW YORK; THE FACTS WERE NOT DESCRIBED (FIRST DEPT).
GIVING A SECOND ALLEN CHARGE AND ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONTINUE DELIBERATING TO 5 OR 6 PM ON A FRIDAY, KNOWING THAT THREE JURORS HAD TRAVEL PLANS FOR MONDAY, DID NOT CONSTITUTE COERCING THE VERDICT, PROVIDING BOTH WRITTEN AND ORAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WAS NOT IMPROPER (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFFS-PARENTS’ CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LOSS OF THEIR INJURED DAUGHTER’S SERVICES SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE PARENTS DEMONSTRATED ONLY THAT THEIR DAUGHTER PERFORMED SERVICES IN HER EMPLOYMENT AT THE COMPANIES OWNED BY THE PARENTS (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

HERE THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO ADD DEFENDANT DESIGN,... DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN “CLOSE PROXIMITY” TO THE DRUGS WITHIN THE MEANING...