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TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO RESENTENCING UNDER THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined County Court properly denied defendant’s request to be resentenced under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA). Defendant pled guilty to manslaughter after her murder and assault convictions were vacated on appeal. She had been in an intimate relationship with the man she killed for a little more than a year:

From the dissent:

Pursuant to Penal Law § 60.12, a court may impose an alternative sentence under the DVSJA when a defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence following a hearing that “(a) at the time of the instant offense, the defendant was a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse inflicted by a member of the same family or household as the defendant as such term is defined in [CPL 530.11 (1)]; (b) such abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant’s criminal behavior; [and] (c) having regard for the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, that a sentence of imprisonment pursuant to [Penal Law §§ 70.00, 70.02, 70.06 or 70.71 (2) or (3)] would be unduly harsh” … . At such a hearing, “the court shall consider oral and written arguments, take testimony from witnesses offered by either party, and consider relevant evidence to assist in making its determination” … . “Reliable hearsay shall be admissible at such hearings” … . “The court may consider any fact or circumstances relevant to the imposition of a new sentence which are submitted by the applicant or the district attorney,” including “the institutional record of confinement of such person” … . “The court’s consideration of the institutional record of confinement of such applicant shall include, but not be limited to, such applicant’s participation in or willingness to participate in programming such as domestic violence, parenting and substance abuse treatment while incarcerated and such applicant’s disciplinary history” … . * * *

… [D]efendant explained that she and the victim had been in a relationship for a little [*8]over a year at the time of the subject incident. Around seven months into their relationship, the victim — who was 65 years old while defendant was 28 — became verbally, sexually and physically abusive. Defendant, who was financially dependent on the victim, detailed “almost daily” acts of violence perpetrated against her during their relationship, including threats to her life and instances in which the victim “slam[med] his fist into the side of [her]head,” “s[u]nk his nails into [her],” punched her, slapped her and scratched her. Defendant also testified that the victim bragged about having previously killed someone, sexually assaulted her while she was bound with a rope and drugged her with hallucinogens. In other statements contained in the record, defendant recounted the victim telling her: “I own you” and “If you leave, I’ll kill you.” He also attempted to control her weight and isolated her from friends and family, taking away her vehicle and phone and leaving her alone for “days on end” at the camp where they resided. She further explained that October 2013 — the month before the incident — was the worst month she had ever experienced in her entire relationship. As for defendant’s assertion that the victim isolated her, defendant’s mother confirmed that, for almost a year before the subject incident, there had been “no communication between [defendant] and her.”

Defendant also presented independent corroborative evidence in this regard … . * * *

A resentencing under CPL 440.47 is warranted. People v Angela VV., 2024 NY Slip Op 03851, Third Dept 7-18-24

​Practice Point: CPL 60.12 allows a reduced sentence for defendants who suffered domestic violence at the hands of the victim, criteria explained.

 

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